An AAIB runway-overrun investigation shows how workload after a go-around and runway change can carry forward into an approach that is too fast and too long.

What happened

Following a go-around and a change of runway in use, the pilot experienced a period of high workload. The aircraft subsequently landed long at a higher than recommended speed, overran the runway, passed through the airport boundary and crossed a road before stopping in a wooded embankment. The pilot was uninjured.

The trap

Completing the go-around does not automatically reset workload. Rebriefing a different runway, repositioning, configuring the aircraft and recalculating the picture all consume capacity. Continuing because the aircraft is now lined up can hide the fact that the approach has not become stable.

Better decision gates

• After a go-around, deliberately rebuild the approach rather than rushing to recover the original plan.
• Confirm runway, wind, available distance, circuit or procedure and landing performance.
• Use a defined stabilised-approach gate appropriate to the operation.
• If speed, position or workload remains outside the plan, go around again or divert.
• Treat runway remaining as a finite resource; an early touchdown assumption is not a performance calculation.

Learning takeaway

A second approach deserves a complete briefing and a fresh decision. A go-around is successful when it creates a safer outcome, not merely when it results in another attempt to land.

Warning signs to notice earlier

• The runway changes after a go-around but the new approach is not fully rebriefed.
• Airspeed remains above the planned value and the touchdown point moves deeper into the runway.
• Completing the second approach feels more important than restoring stable criteria.

Decision analysis

A go-around removes the immediate landing risk but can leave workload, surprise and time pressure intact. A runway change adds new wind, geometry, distance and circuit considerations. The aircraft should not be allowed to descend into another landing attempt until those elements have been rebuilt into a coherent plan.

Landing performance depends on actual threshold speed, touchdown point, runway condition and available distance. Excess speed carries additional energy and can extend the landing substantially. A hoped-for early touchdown is not a correction for an unstable approach.

Safer alternatives to discuss

Create space with another circuit, hold if permitted, divert or make a second go-around. The safest choice may feel inefficient, but it restores time for a complete brief and calculation. Use a clear stabilised-approach gate and treat failure to meet it as a decision, not a suggestion.

In a training discussion, calculate how runway remaining changes when touchdown moves beyond the planned aiming area, using approved data for the aircraft rather than a generic multiplier. Then add a wet surface or tailwind within limits and observe how quickly independent margins can disappear.

Instructor or group debrief

1. Which parts of the briefing changed with the runway?
2. At what gate were speed and position no longer acceptable?
3. What option would create time to reset workload?
4. How will touchdown point and actual conditions enter the performance check?

Do not copy actions from this learning scenario into an aircraft checklist. Transfer the decision-making lesson, then use current official information, approved aircraft procedures and qualified instruction for the operation itself.

How to use this case responsibly

Separate the evidence from the teaching interpretation. First list only what the cited source or scenario actually establishes. Then list the assumptions that would need checking: aircraft variant, installed equipment, weather, runway state, pilot qualification, local procedures and the exact sequence of events. This prevents a memorable story from becoming an invented checklist.

Before the next relevant flight, turn one lesson into a concrete briefing item or decision gate and verify it against the current AFM or POH, official aeronautical information and operator procedures. If the case exposes a skill gap, rehearse it with a qualified instructor under suitable conditions. After the flight, record whether the warning sign appeared, whether the gate was usable and what should change next time.

For a group debrief, ask which decision was last easily reversible, which cue was available at that moment and what pressure encouraged continuation. Compare at least two safer alternatives and identify the new risks each would introduce. The aim is not hindsight blame; it is to build options early enough that the safest action remains practical.